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I. Background
The large body of literature on enterprise restructuring in Transition Economies is
composed primarily of studies based on evidence from Central and East European (CEE)
countries'. So far very little effort has been made to understand the post-privatization
performance in countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU), outside Russia 2. The reason
is perhaps that the privatization and restructuring in FSU countries lagged somewhat
behind of that in CEE countries. In addition, the absence of established systems of data
collection is believed to be at least partly responsible for the lack of research in the area.
The paper intends to provide an overview of the privatization process in Lithuania
and to look for potential patterns in the link between enterprise performance and
ownership. The main question posed in the paper is whether observed improvements in
enterprise performance are in any way caused by privatization and changes in business
environment in which enterprises operate.
Researching post-privatization enterprise performance in Lithuania is of significant
interest for a number of reasons. Before the collapse of Soviet Union, Lithuanian
economy was highly integrated into Soviet economy. Enterprises were almost never
involved in marketing and distribution of their products.  Export and import were
channeled through central planning agencies in Moscow. Since regaining its
independence in 1991, Lithuania has made significant progress in developing its private
institutions. The 1991 Law on Privatization originated the distribution of vouchers to the
population. The distributional approach to state property transformation (i.e. voucher or
mass privatization) received wide support from the public. It was believed that a high
speed of privatization would ensure the success of economic reforms creating more
'  See for exapmle Pinto et al. (1993), Frydman et al. (1997), Smith et al. (1997), Pohl et
al. (1997) among others.
2 Exceptions are Estrin and Rosevear (1999) and Djankon (1999). For the case of  Russia
see Barberis et al. (1996), Earle and-Estrin (1997), Linz and Krueger (1998) among
others. Anderson, Lee and Murrell (1999) and Andeson, Korsun and Murrell (1999) are
2favorable conditions for foreign investment while a cash-based commercial privatization
program to be introduced at a latter stage would compensate the shortcomings of mass
privatization. However, despite being a mass privatization program by nature, the
resulting (Stage I) privatization program of 1991-1995 largely favored incumbent
workers and management. (See Section III for an extended discussion).
The study of Lithuania allows us to re-examine post-privatization restructuring in
an economy that was integrated into the Soviet economic system more than the CEE
countries. The advantage of Lithuania is the longer history of privatization and
restructuring relative to other FSU countries and the relatively high quality of data.
However, one should be aware that the Baltics are in many respects different from the
other FSU countries because of their historical heritage, proximity to the West, and
shorter tenure of Soviet rule.
The paper is structured in the following way.  Section II review empirical
literature on the relationship between state ownership and enterprise performance.
Section III provides an overview of privatization process in Lithuania  and examines
some stylized facts in post-privatization ownership distribution and corporate control.
Section IV describes the dataset used in the analysis and provides basic indication of
improved perfonnance of enterprises, and the link between ownership and performance.
The econometric model and regression results are discussed in Section V.  Finally,
Section VI concludes.
II. State Ownership
There has by now grown a large body of empirical literature explaining different patterns
in enterprise performance in the Transition Economies. Researchers usually study the set
of issues related to state vs. private ownership bearing in mind the fundamental
differences in incentive structures and constraints facing state and private owners. The
underlying assumption  for the effect of ownership on performance is that (concentrated
outside) private owners have all the incentives and the ability to take measures aimed at
notable exceptions as they touch upon privatization and restructuring in a former Soviet
block country outside of CEE and FSU, Mongolia.
3the increase of operational efficiency of the enterprise. On the other hand, since (in the
context of transition from plan to market) for most enterprises privatization will imply
losing any existing subsidies and state protection (including output distribution network),
one would expect private firms to adopt more aggressive restructuring strategy and hence
demonstrate better performance. Consequently, one would expect a significant difference
between private and state owned firms in terms of performance and restructuring activity.
The difference in performance between state and private (privatized) firms in
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) view is due to the fact that politicians are likely to impose a
number of objectives on the management of a state firm other than common profit
maximization. In particular they argue that it is in politicians' direct interest to push for
employment maximization, hence less employment restructuring and fewer layoffs in
state firms.
Frydman et al. (1997, 1998a) distinguish between revenue and cost performance of
enterprises. Following Shleifer and Vishny, they believe that it is the inability of state
firms to layoff workers (due to politicization of decision making) that undermines the
cost performance of state enterprises 3. On the other hand, the difference in revenue
performance between state and private firms is largely determined by lack of incentives
(hence different attitudes towards risk taking), different degrees of accountability, and
lack of human (managerial) capital 4. However they conclude that overall privatization is
more effective in improving revenue rather than cost performance of enterprises.
Yet in some countries state ownership has proven to be at least as efficient as
private ownership in terms of stimulating enterprise performance and restructuring. Earle
and Estrin (1997) and Linz and Krueger (1998) report no significant differences between
the effect of state and private ownership on performance in Russia. Anderson, Lee and
Murrell (1999) study on Mongolia finds that state ownership outperformed both insider
'They  show empirically that this is true in particular where there is significant active
state involvement/interest in the monitoring of the enterprise (see Frydman et al. (1998a),
Table 1).
4 However they do not find conclusive evidence in support of their human capital
argument: the managers of state firms in their sample were not statistically different from
their private sector counterparts when a number of human capital characeristics
4and outsider private ownership in terms of its effect on a number of performance
indicators when endogeneity of ownership is controlled for.  Authors argue that the state
has both the necessary experience and incentives to oversee restructuring while private
owners are either too dispersed (outsiders) or do not have efficiency as the main goal
(insiders).
However, this seems to be particularly true for the countries with underdeveloped
legal and regulatory framework, unsound business environment, and weak contract
enforcement. And as Nellis (1999) notes "the further east one travels, the more the
required supporting, larger economic process of financial discipline, competition and
freedom of entry have not been attended to".  Perhaps a more extreme view of the
importance of institutional factors is the one presented by Tandon (1995) who argues that
it is the level of competition and not the ownership that effects performance and
efficiency.  Slightly less restrictive argument is put forward by Stiglitz (1998) who
believes that conditions under which a privatized company "pursues a full range of social
objectives  ... are highly restrictive, corresponding closely to highly restrictive conditions
under which the fundamental theorems of welfare economics were established".  Thus, I
hypothesize, it is the failure of these conditions (free and costless exchange, competitive
markets and households, enforcement of transactions, etc.) to prevail in some Transition
Economies, that effectively undermines the effectiveness of private (privatized)
enterprise performance, among other social objectives, vis-a-vis that of state enterprises 5.
The link between business environment (or more precisely, lack thereof) and
economic performance in a planned economy has been studied by Janos Komai. In what
by now has become a classical work, Komai (1980) coined the state where enterprises
enjoyed a variety of state-originated subsidies and privileges as soft budget constraint.
The phenomenon was not specific to any enterprise or sector, but instead was fairly
widespread and transparent across the Socialist Block. Kornai argued that soft budget
(education, age, tenure, etc.) were accounted for. In fact, managerial skills seem to play
an important role in both cost and revenue performance of enterprises.
5 Here the word effectiveness is used in a very broad economic sense, including level of
output, productivity, cost efficiency and other performance indicators, that can be used to
make judgements about welfare implications of a firm's production activities.
5constraints were associated with poor performance of enterprises since they did not create
the financial discipline and accountability necessary for efficiency and growth.
However, in the present day transition context, it is not at all clear whether state
ownership is necessarily complementary to the use of subsidies, and if so, whether
subsidies have been detrimental to the efficiency of enterprises. A potential link between
state support and performance (opposite to what has been pointed out by Komai) arises
because generally the state is known to extend preferential treatment to enterprises it
controls (by offering state contracts, protection from import competition, participation in
state subsidized programs, etc.), which have a potential of benefiting the enterprises (at
6 least in the short run) in the presence of shrinking markets and collapsing trade links . In
any case, this dictates the necessity of accounting for direct state support (along with
controlling for the effect of state share on performance indicators) if we were to judge the
full extent of state ownership of and assistance to enterprises, and account for the
differences in the business environments where state and private firms operate. There is
some empirical evidence from Transition Economies demonstrating the importance of
hard budget constraints in disciplining enterprises and improving performance (see Estrin
et al. (1995), Pinto et al. (1993), etc).
On the other hand, however, Earle and Estrin (1998) report no (negative)
relationship between state assistance (and in particular, state subsidies) and labor
productivity for their sample of Russian enterprises. In their research on Mongolia,
Anderson  et al. (1999) also find no conclusive  evidence  of the effect of (perceived)  state
support on performance. These results should be treated with caution and by no means
interpreted as suggesting a general performance-improving role of state subsidies. The
emerging conclusion (which still has to be tested in the series of forthcoming papers)
might well be that, in the presence of generally weak business environment, benefits
associated with state support (in terms of preserving output levels and thus improving
short run measures of productivity from what they might have been, had there not been
6 Potential positive effect of subsides are likely to be detectable in some performance
indicators (sales, exports) but not in the others (total factor productivity, cost efficiency),
suggesting that subsidies might be helpful in keeping enterprises afloat rather than
improving their efficiency.
6any state support) might outweigh the costs of moral hazard (also associated with state
support).
III. Privatization in Lithuania 8
General Background
Since regaining its independence in 1990 Lithuania has made significant progress in
developing private market institutions. The private sector's share of GDP currently
accounts for over 70 percent. Part of this growth undoubtedly came from new
established enterprises, yet most of it has been attributed to privatized entities.
The Government showed a firm commitment to voucher privatization and after
the Law on Privatization was adopted in February 1991 distribution of vouchers to the
population began. However, distribution of property under the adopted privatization
scheme did not start until September 1991 when relevant privatization agencies were
established.
An important feature of state property transformation in Lithuania was the
dominant role played by investment vouchers. The latter might have been (1) used for
privatization of industrial enterprises, housing, and land, (2) exchanged for shares in
Investment Stock Companies, or (3) sold for cashl'.  The main argument of opponents of
mass privatization was that the scheme will fail to form effective private owners and
provide appropriate corporate governance. However arguments like the speed of
7Since  policy implications of this conclusion might be very important and politically
sensitive, the issue will be given careful treatment in the subsequent papers. As a starting
point it should be noted that including the amount of subsidies as a regressor in the
performance regressions is likely to bias the estimated coefficients for at least two
reasons: (1) subsidies could be endogenous to performance, and (2) subsidies might be
correlated with state share ownership in the firm.
8 I thank Diana Sutkaityte (Swedish Trade Consul, Vilnius, Lithuania) for providing in-
depth infornation on Lithuanian Privatization and allowing me to use products of her
own research in this Section.
9 The Central Privatization Commission (CPC) was the state agency charged with the
management of privatization process until the end of voucher privatization in July 1995.
The wide network of local privatization commissions and agencies were coordinated by
the CPC through the Privatization Department of the Ministry of Economics.
7privatization, equity and fairness, and the necessity to compensate citizens for low wages
during the socialist regime were brought up to support the mass privatization scheme.
Finally, two thirds of state owned property was put up for privatization to be carried out
in two stages: Stage I -mass privatization for vouchers, Litas and foreign currency, and
Stage II - commercial privatization for Litas and foreign currency
Stage  I - Mass Privatization
There were more than 8,000 state enterprises before privatization in Lithuania. After four
subsequent revaluations the total value of state assets was estimated at Lt 13.6 billion.
The initial privatization program involved 6,644 enterprises (82 percent of all enterprises)
with Lt 9.8 Billion in total assets. More than 5,700 enterprises (with Lt 7 billion worth of
state capital in book value) were offered using four basic initial privatization methods:
share offerings, auctions, best business plan competitions and cash sales.
The vouchers were distributed to population via voucher accounts with the state
Savings Bank. The nominal value of the vouchers received depended on an individual's
age and was indexed several times during the program.  A total of Lt 10.5 billion of
investment vouchers had been distributed to nearly 2.5 million citizens. Around 93
percent of vouchers were used. Of that amount 65 percent were used for privatization of
enterprises, 19 percent for housing privatization, with the residual used for agricultural
enterprises and land".  The first stage of privatization ended in July 199512.
10 At the beginning trading of privatization vouchers was prohibited. It was legalized
only in 1993 after Government's decree on State One -Time Payments and Other Special
Compensations.
I  IInitially, vouchers and other special compensation notes which were not used in the
privatization process should have been turned in exchange for government securities.
However, the Government subsequently announced that this will not be implemented
since it has already accumulated a sizeable internal debt and its further increase will not
be considered. Instead, in order to collect the amount of unclaimed investment vouchers,
a number of large enterprises were added to the privatization list.
12 The first stage was scheduled to come to a finish by the end of 1992. It turned out,
however, that a large amount of vouchers were still held by the public. Furthermore, the
introduction of national currency was postponed, and the National Stock Exchange was
established only in September 1993. As a result the first stage of privatization lasted until
mid-1995. On the legislative side, a new Law on Privatization was adopted and put to
work in February 1993. This resulted in the only significant change in the process of
8Table 1. Use of investment vouchers in Lithuania as of September 1995
State properties offered through auctions and best-business-plan competitions were both
fully subscribed. Meanwhile, the results of privatization in enterprises which were
subject to share offerings (2,920 units worth Lt 2631 million) and cash sales (46 units
worth Lt 27.6 million) were as follows: 91 and 66 percent in terms of state capital, and 99
and 65 percent of units offered respectively.
Both speed and scope of privatization reached their peak by the end of 1992. At
that time figures already were quite impressive: 54 percent of enterprises and 30 percent
of assets sold. In short, out of all successful privatization deals, 15 percent by number
and 3 percent in terms of capital were concluded during the last four months of 1991,
while for the following years the yearly figures were 39 and 27 percent in 1992, 22 and
31 percent in 1993, 15 and 26 percent in 1994, and 9 and 13 percent for the first half of
1995.
Small scale privatization
Privatization of approximately three-quarters of small enterprises offered for privatization
(2,000 out of 2,727) was completed by mid  1993.  651 small business entities were
privatized  through  the  first  four  months  of  privatization  between  September  and
December  1991, over  1200 during  1992  and  about  350  in  the  first  half  of  1993.
Privatization of the remaining quarter of small entities (about 700 units) lasted until the
end of voucher privatization in July 1995. In total, 2,727 small entities were sold through
auctions collecting Lt 165 million. Additionally, 33 small enterprises in the service sector
were sold at open foreign currency auctions for total of Lt 17.6 million.
Large scale privatization
Public share offering was the major privatization method since September 1991. Most of
privatization deals including 51 percent by number of privatized units and 91 percent in
terms of state capital transferred to private ownership were concluded using this method.
privatization: it allowed insiders to hold 50 percent of shares instead of originally
allocated 30 percent (the additional 20 percent did not carry voting rights however). This
9During public subscription of shares for nearly 3,000 enterprises over Lt 5.8 billion worth
vouchers were used for shares with a total nominal face value of Lt 2.6 billion (see Table
1). The standard subscription scheme was applied in all sectors, except agriculture,
forestry, housing and some specialized activities 13. Most share offerings occurred in
Industry (25 percent), Construction (19.8 percent) and Trade (21 percent).
Privatization  tenders,  or so-called best business plan competitions, were carried
out only in cases when public subscription of shares or sale of controlling blocks failed to
attract buyers at auctions. Between 1993 and 1995 there were 15 large industrial
enterprises privatized by tenders for nearly Lt 500 million.
In addition, since 1993 privatization authorities have organizedforeign currency
open tenders  where investors were invited to submnit  their bids. Within this fram,ework,
14 international tenders were announced, for individual entities ranging from small and
average size to a monopoly in the respective field (e.g. tobacco factory). Controlling
shares in only four of these units were sold to strategic foreign investorsl  while others
remained unsold or were subsequently acquired by domestic (cash) bidders. After
completion of voucher privatization in 1995, all further sales were open to both foreign
and local buyers without any restrictions.
Stage II - Commercial Privatization
As it became clear that the goals of the first stage of privatization were achieved,
transition to commercial methods of privatization became justified on the grounds of
achieving allocative efficiency. However this transition was coupled with a worsening
was believed to have further reduced the speed of privatization through limiting outside
participation.
13The  principal mechanism for public share offerings remained largely unchanged until
July 1995. The bidding process was designed as follows: shares were initially offered at a
fixed price related to the book value of the enterprise. Bidding was considered over if the
subscription reached 80 percent and did not exceed 110 percent of the number of shares
offered. Otherwise, a price adjustment procedure was applied to equate demand and
supply within the predefined range and with the same selling price for all buyers. A
minimum of 5 percent of this price was due to be paid in cash. However, cash payments
could not exceed 50 percent of the vouchers paid.
14These  sales yielded USD 30 million with investment pledges of no less than USD 100
million.
10macroeconomic situation and a deteriorating financial state of both state and privatized
enterprises. As a result, privatization of large infrastructure enterprises (valued
approximately at Lt 3.4 billion) was originally postponed until year 2000 5.  Yet insiders
were allowed to acquire up to 10 percent of shares in these enterprises. In addition, only
insider privatization was allowed (and limited to 30 percent of shares) in strategic
enterprises worth total Lt 3.4 billion. Thus only the remaining non-strategic portion (200
enterprises worth Lt 3 billion in book value terms) was to be put up for cash sale during
second stage of privatization' 6.
Thus 47 and 272 enterprises were privatized for total amount of Lt 3.2 and Lt 80.9
million in 1996 and 1997 respectively (no privatization took place in 1995 under
commercial privatization program).
Commercial Privatization Law
The new Law on Privatization of State Property defining the strategy of the second stage
of privatization was adopted in July 4, 1995 and became operational on September 15,
1995'7.  This privatization program was based on sales for Litas and foreign currency and
put more emphasis on finding strategic investors for the remaining large SOEs. The Law
stated that shares or any property owned by state or municipality except residential
dwellings owned by municipalities can be subject to privatization. The Law also lifted the
ban on foreign land ownership.
Privatization Agents
On the state level there were two institutions charged with privatization: Lithuanian State
Privatization Agency (LSPA) and Privatization Commission. LSPA was the
15 However, privatization of large infrastructure companies already began in 1998.
16 From total number of about 3,000 enterprises/assets only in about 200 of them the state
held majority shares. In the remaining enterprises the state share reached 10 percent on
average.  In these enterprises the state had practically lost control over management and
the state shares had (marginal) value in terms of governance only in cases when
additional votes were needed for existing parties to reach majority.
17 The old Law on Voucher Privatization however remained in place for privatization
deals approved before September 15, 1995. The new Law was influenced by experience
11implementing agency acting on behalf of the Government. The Privatization
Commission in turn was appointed by Parliament and played mainly a supervisory role
over the LSPA.
Privatization Procedure
In summary the steps could be outlined as follows:
1.  preparation (by LSPA) of the annual list of enterprises to be privatized with
subsequent approval by the Government;
2.  preparation of detailed privatization program for each enterprise and its approval by
Privatization Commission;
3.  announcing the program in the Privatization Bulletin and elsewhere in the media;
4.  public offering organized by LSPA or with assistance from the National Stock
Exchange;
5.  approval of privatization outcome by the Privatization Commission
6.  signing ownership transfer titles by LSPA with subsequent approval by the
Privatization Commission.
Should the first privatization attempt fail, the program was repeated or a new program
approved. Otherwise the entity would be removed from the privatization list.
Methods of privatization
Unlike the mass privatization, the new law ensured sufficient diversity of methods. The
following ones were made available for use during Stage II privatization 8: public tender,
public auction, lease with the right to purchase, direct bargaining, and public offering of
shares.
However, there were several restrictions on using any particular method of
privatization. Public tender was to be used only by enterprises valued at more than Lt 50
thousand if, in addition, the state had a majority shareholding. Lease with the right to
purchase applied to physical property such as equipment, buildings, but not to shares.
obtained during voucher privatization including attempts to fight corruption and other
illegal activities.
12Use of direct bargaining was restricted to cases when auction or tender failed to pick a
winner, however, there was at least one potential purchaser. Auctions were primarily
used when the entire state package was up for sale, especially in cases of minority state
holdings. If a Joint Stock Company was public, share offerings were to be done through
the National Stock Exchange 19.  The following section presents some stylized facts
observed concerning post-privatization corporate control in Lithuania.
Stylized Facts
*  Insider Ownership: Although privileges for insiders were insignificant in the
beginning of privatization, they expanded as the process continued (note the 1993 Law on
Privatization) and management/employee buyout became a more popular method of
enterprise privatization at least for the first stage of privatization of 1991-1995. This
resulted in insider-controlled corporate structures in many privatized enterprises.
*  Outsider Ownership: The privatization program in Lithuania has resulted in too little
corporate governance by strategic owners capable of bringing about enterprise
restructuring and participating actively in corporate control. Bearing in mind the role
institutional investors played in the privatization process, it was expected that they would
have significant impact on enterprise restructuring and corporate governance. But this
turned out to be true only in some cases. Limited financial and human resources as well
as information asymmetries, among other reasons, prevented outsider monitoring from
being as efficient as it otherwise might have been.
Investment Stock Companies (ISC): Investment Funds (called Investment Stock
Companies) emerged in Lithuania after voucher privatization program. They were
legally authorized under a Government decree in October 1991. All ISCs started off as
closed-end funds and were engaged in collecting privatization vouchers and investing
them in privatized companies. Originally they were allowed to trade shares of companies
18 The main methods of the second stage were intended to be international tenders and
public offerings through Stock Exchange to encourage foreign participation.
9 The new Law on Privatization was passed on November 4, 1997, which abandoned
some shortcomings of the law from 1995. The major change was an establishing of a
"one-stop shop" - State Property Fund (SPF) -whose functions, besides
13only on the Stock Exchange. Subsequently, however, ISCs introduced block share
tradings among themselves which, if done with no parallel cash payments necessary,
need not go through the Exchange.
At initial stages of mass privatization, some large ISCs have taken the form of
holding companies and tried to exert corporate governance. In some cases they had
enough influence to replace existing management. However, in general, this influence
was limited because the number of enterprises in which any one investment company (or
group of ISCs) has controlling interest is quite small.  There is evidence that, in cases
when several ISCs together owned a particular enterprise, they co-operated to form a
controlling block. Although at the beginning of privatization in Lithuania ISCs were
forming their portfolios somewhat incidentally (based on availability), they tended to
increase concentration of their holdings as more privatizations took off.
Banks: Contrary to ISCs, enterprise restructuring by banks has been limited
because of legal restraints. Commercial banks were not permitted to participate in the
equity of joint stock companies. Consequently they were not in the position to oversee
the restructuring of the enterprises directly, but in some cases did so indirectly through
their lending policies.
*  State Ownership: On the other hand, the state practically lost control in partially
privatized enterprises. From total number of about 3,000 enterprises and assets, in which
the state still retained some ownership rights after first stage of privatization, only about
200 of them were majority state owned. (The latter were privatized during second stage
in 1995-1997). In the remaining enterprises the state share reached 10% on average. In
these enterprises the state had practically lost control over management and state shares
had only marginal value in terms of governance in cases when additional votes were
needed for an existing party to reach effective majority.
denationalization, include management of residual state shares and monitoring of
implementation of purchase agreements.
14IV. Data Description
The data to be used in the analysis is collected by the Lithuanian Department of Statistics
and covers the period of 1995-1997. The dataset is unique as it contains information on
over 5,300 small, medium and large enterprises for each year in Lithuania with very
detailed and consistent coverage of financial data  20.  Along with Balance Sheet and
Income Statement data, the set contains information on employment, ownership structure,
regional as well as sectoral division of enterprises. We have every reason to assume that
the sample is not statistically different from the entire population of enterprises, which is
being monitored by the Lithuanian Department of Statistics. It should be noted that the
dataset covers approximately 35 percent of economically active population (labor force)
in Lithuania for 1997.
Distribution of enterprises by number of workers is provided in Table 2.  The
average size of the enterprises has dropped by more than 20 percent since 1995 owing
primarily to reduction in the number of large enterprises (over 200 employees) in the
sample from 555 in 1995 to 465 in 1997. It is important to note that there is a consistent
increase in the share of enterprises with number of workers between 10 and 50.
Table 2. Basic Employment Statistics
Table 3 shows some productivity indicators for a balanced panel of 5,139 enterprises for
1996-1997  by sectors. An interesting pattern emerges here: all five sectors have cut their
employment levels by amounts ranging from 2.8 to 25 percent in 1997 while enjoying
considerable increases in labor productivity measures. The highest average real increase
in Value Added per worker was registered in Utilities (over 50 percent) with the lowest
being in Manufacturing (16 percent). However the relative ranking changes for Revenue-
per-worker figures with the highest increase of 25.3 percent observed in Manufacturing
and the lowest of 13.4 percent in Utilities. While in general this could be viewed as a sign
of successful restructuring by enterprises, further analysis of the data is needed to
20 After excluding observations with missing values for Total Assets, Revenues, or
Employment the set still contains 5,799, 5,347 and 7,185 observations for 1995, 1996 and
1997 respectively.
15determine whether there are significant difference in the restructuring behavior (as
measured here by layoffs) between state and privatized enterprises.
Table 3. Some Performance Indicators for Balanced Panel by Sectors, 1996-1997
Another pattern is worth noting here. A brief look at Revenue (total as well as per
worker) figures vis-a-vis Value Added suggests that costs of non-labor inputs for
Manufacturing and Others have gone up disproportionately higher compared to their
corresponding output prices. In contrast, output prices for Utilities, Construction and
Services increased by more than their respective non-labor input prices, thus generating
higher growth of Value Added than that of Revenues.
Table 4, in turn, looks at performance indicators of enterprises with various degrees
of state participation. An interesting picture emerges as one looks at the Revenue-per-
worker figures: for 1996, enterprises with more than 50 percent (but less than 100
percent) state ownership recorded more than 45 percent higher revenue per worker than
their fully state owned counterparts. The figure reaches 180 percent when fully state
owned companies are compared to those with less than 20 percent state participation.
The difference is even more pronounced for 1997 where revenue per unit of labor for the
enterprises with less than 20 percent state ownership is more than three times greater than
that of enterprises fully owned by the state. Yet the results in the third column are
believed to be seriously biased because of inclusion of de novo enterprises. In addition,
improvement in labor productivity might be a result of changes in capital-to-labor ratio
which cannot practically be detected unless we control for the amount of capital used in
the production process.
Table 4. Relationship between Revenue performance and State Share, 1995-1997
The following sections treat these problems seriously.
16V. The Model
Let us assume that enterprise productivity is determined by a functional
relationship
Yi  =F(Xi)+Ei  i= 1.  ........  N;  (1)
where Xi is a K dimensional set of observed characteristics (technology, competition,
ownership, industry type, etc.) affecting productivity and c, is the error term which
includes characteristics unobserved by the researcher.  Assuming further a linear
functional relationship for F(-) produces:
yi = Xi8  + Ei  (2)
If elements of {  Xi, c, }  are not correlated, the OLS will produce consistent estimates of
vector a. However, if they are not independent OLS estimates of coefficients will not be
consistent. It is important to see in this regard where a possible correlation between
elements of X and E could be coming from.  Assume that something that affects
enterprise performance also affected, say, the privatization outcome and thus private
share ownership at privatization - a variable included in X. Since the omitted or missing
variable in question is not a part of X, it will have to be a part of 6, thus creating
correlation between X and F. In reality it is not unreasonable to assume that ownership
mix as well as ownership concentration are likely to be endogenous to, or jointly
determined with, enterprise performance. It might be argued that "better" firms are more
likely to have large foreign (as well as insider) ownership (see Smith et al. (1997) for
discussion). Similarly, the state might choose to privatize better companies earlier and
undertake restructuring in the remaining ones (which are perhaps being viewed as non-
competitive in the new environment). In any of these cases, even though the change in
ownership per se does not lead to a change in behavior, a positive correlation between
ownership and performance variables will be observed 21. Moreover, if any of the
21 The selection bias would perhaps be harder to detect in insider, particularly in
managerially, owned enterprises. The reason is because knowing that the enterprise will
be subjected to a MEBO (management-employee  buyout), managers of a "good"
enterprise have every incentive to understate the true value of the company (by
17variables that jointly determine both enterprise performance and ownership structure at
privatization (e.g. old technology and capital stock, thin market for enterprise's output,
etc.) were missing from equation (2), the OLS estimates would not be consistent.
Controlling for endogeneity associated with selection of enterprises for
privatization is particularly important for commercial (Stage II, for-cash) as opposed to
mass (Stage I, voucher) privatization schemes. The reasoning behind this is quite
intuitive. Although as pointed out above the state has kept on average 10 percent of
residual shareholding in enterprises privatized under mass privatization scheme, the
decision to put an enterprise (or an asset) up for privatization (under Stage I) was unlikely
to be dependent on any performance related criteria but was in fact based on the size (i.e.
small and medium as opposed to large) and sectoral considerations (i.e. Services vs.
Energy, etc). Collective evidence suggests that there had been very little pre-selection of
enterprises carried out under Stage I before they were (fully or partially) privatized. On
the other hand, the decision to privatize an enterprise under Stage H privatization scheme
was largely dependent upon factors like strategic importance of the enterprise for the
state, availability of "right" strategic investors, and the state's ability to raise funds both
at privatization (sales value) and in the future (tax receipts) - all predominantly
performance related indicators. Failing to control for selection bias introduced by the
state supposedly picking enterprises for privatization, will lead to severe problems in
estimation.
From a variety of methods available to provide consistent estimates of regression
coefficients in equation (2), we will employ a linear instrumental variable estimator
(2SLS) 22. (We will nevertheless use conventional OLS estimates as a benchmark
underreporting revenues/profits or even supressing output) which they will be offered to
buy at a later date. Thus even though the enterprise is "good" and is subsequently
privatized to insiders (i.e. the "true" selection bias), it becomes hard to determine the
extent of the bias, due to understated enterprise performance/value indicators.
22 A quick refresher look at basic properties of linear instrumental variable estimator and
restrictions imposed on the set of instruments might be useful at this stage. Let Z be an
M dimensional set of instruments. If the system is exactly identified (i.e. M = K), or in
other words if inverse of (Z'X) exists, the instrumental variable estimate of regression
coefficients can be presented as: /3lv =  (Z X )-I Z Y.
18comparison case). The analysis will consist of two steps. First, we will focus on the
determinants of ownership structure by regressing private ownership share on a set of
instruments -potential determinants of ownership structure at privatization. Next, the
fitted (estimated) values of  private ownership variable from the first stage will be used to
estimate the effect of ownership on enterprise performance 23. This two stage approach
will utilize a set of pre-privatization characteristics to be discussed below. Significant
differences between OLS and 2SLS estimates will be indicative of selection bias
discussed above. More formally it can be tested  by the Hausman (1978) test or the
omitted variables (OV) version of the same test.
However, it should be noted that, although the 2SLS estimator used in this case will
be a consistent estimator of regression coefficients, it will not be an efficient one.
Moreover, the asymptotic covariance matrix will be larger, the smaller the correlation is
between ownership variable and different instruments. To put it differently, the
regression results will be as good as the choice of instruments themselves.
Following Anderson, Lee and Murrell (1999) we specify the second stage
regression equation in the following manner:
In this case the set of instruments will have to satisfy the following two requirements:
(1) plim (Z'X)/T exists and nonsingular, and
(2) plim (Z' E)/T = 0
However, in case when M > K (i.e. we have more instruments than variables to be
instrumented), a choice of K linear combinations of M instruments should be selected, for
which an obvious candidate is the fitted value of X from the regression of X on Z.
Noting that the later can be presented  as X  =  Z (Z  Z ) -'  z  'X  the Two Stage Least
Squares estimates -a variant of IV estimates presented above -of regression coefficients
will be asfollows:  I3 2S,  = [X  'Z (Z  Zf  -1 Z'X  V-1  X  'Z (Z''Z)-  Y  Z  Y.
It can be shown that this is identical to  I,V,  in case if the inverse of (ZX) exists.  In the
case of 2SLS the requirement (1) above translates into one for correlation between Z and
X, with higher correlation leading to a lower asymptotic variance-covariance matrix.
(Note that here we can not talk about minimum asymptotic efficiency because of a
potentially large number of Z's available).
3 For ways of accounting for the selection bias in the recent Transition literature see
Anderson, Lee and Murrell (1999), Barberis et al (1996), Earle and Estrin (1997), Earle
(1998), etc.
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where yi is the logarithm of underlying performance indicator of ith  firm, ESPROWNi  is
the estimated share of private ownership from the first-stage regression, BEi vector of
variables describing business environment (which in our case includes measures of
product market competition and state support), Di is a set of industry dummies, and ui is
the error term.  The following section discusses the choice of dependent variable in
Equation 3.
Measuring Dependent Variable
The corporate governance literature on developed market economies has used a variety of
alternative ways to measure enterprise performance. A number of authors (e.g. Demsetz
and Lehn (1985), McConnel and Servaes (1990), Morck et al. (1988), and Shleifer and
Vishny (1986)) have provided insights for using accounting profits, stock market prices,
and Tobin's Q as measures of performance in a developed market setting. However, as
plausible as they are for measuring enterprise performance in the context of developed
market economies, they are either unavailable on a wide enough scale (Stock Market
prices, Tobin's Q) or simply unreliable (accounting profits) in the Transition context.
Another critical issue in this regard is the choice of level vs. change in performance
indicator - a topic that has been in the center of debate in the recent Transition literature.
A list of studies which use change of performance indicator as a dependent variable
includes Claessens and Djankov (1998), Weiss and Nikitin (1998), Frydman et al. (1997,
1998b), etc. On the other hand Anderson, Lee and Murrell (1999), Claessens and
Djankov (1999a), Smith et al. (1997) use level of dependent variable. However it should
be noted that specifications which use change in dependent variable as a performance
indicator (hereafter, change specification) contain a serious pitfall which seems to have
been overlooked by the advocates of that approach. Quite logically, the issue of an
appropriate price deflator is the first one to be addressed when change specification is
20picked up in favor of level one. At the times of rapid economic transformation, such as
the one observed in Eastern Europe and FSU, drastic changes in product range and
product quality from year to year are very common. Not accounting for changes in range
and, most importantly quality of new products, while calculating the price deflator (and
subsequently  inflation), will introduce the so-called New Product and Quality Biases,
which are known to overstate the "true" movement in price level 24. It is not very difficult
to see that the bias becomes larger the greater the speed of transformation and
technological change 25. With this in mind, we argue that using disaggregated industry-
level price deflator (so calculated) to determine the change in real output (in a rapidly
changing Transition Economy) is bound to understate the extent of change in the
performance measures of faster growing/transforming industries and subsequently the
overall effect of ownership on performance.
A fairly intuitive approach to choosing between level and change specifications
was recommended by Earle and Estrin (1998), and Earle (1998). Instead of imposing
either measure of dependent variable, they let "data decide" the appropriate specification
to be used by including a lagged (pre-privatization) level of dependent variable (in their
case labor productivity) as a regressor.  They estimate the coefficient to be around 0.45
and significantly different from 1, upon which they reject the specification where the
dependent variable is the change in the performance indicator. However, if an important
variable is omitted from the regression, the validity of their test would be seriously
26 undermined by the bias in both the regression coefficients and the standard errors  . We
will follow this approach as a complementary one and focus on results which are not
dependent on equation specification. Equation 3 can then be re-written as follows:
24 The idea behind these biases is quite simple: a part of the inflation we observe is due to
the improved quality of products (better computers and better cars) and a larger variety of
subsitutes available. Inflation would have been less if we could account for better quality
and larger variety of products.
25 I owe this insight to my discussions with Gerhard Pohl.
26 This might be the case expecially when the specifics of the production function are
omitted from the estimation. Inclusion of lagged dependent variable as a remedy in this
case is as good as the assumption of unchanged (pre- and post-privatization) capital to
labor ratio itself.
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where Lag.Performance 95 is the lagged value of dependent variable, and TotAst is the
book value of total assets to capture the size effect.
Bearing in mind the above discussion and restrictions imposed by the dataset, the
following indicators of enterprise performance will be used in the analysis: the level of
sales and exports in Equation 3 and labor productivity (measured as revenue per labor) in
Equation 4. Using exports as a dependent variable in Equation 3 has a very intuitive
justification.  Although being a part of sales, volume of exports contains additional
information in that it provides an indication of quality-adjusted output. It can be argued
that ceteris paribus non-zero level of exports is indicative of better quality of enterprise's
output bearing in mind the amount of "quality control" and competition that exporters are
likely to face in foreign markets. The following sections justify the selection of
instruments and sample size to be used in the analysis.
Choice of Instruments
As discussed above, the primary objectives for selecting instruments is their high
correlation with Private Share Ownership at privatization and no correlation with the
error term in the performance equation.  The choice of instruments should come from
understanding of privatization process and the factors that might have determined state's
willingness to privatize the enterprise and subsequently the choice of residual state
shareholding. Obviously, the variety of factors possibly affecting state's interest in
preserving some degree of ownership in an enterprise might range from (pre-
privatization) profitability of the enterprise, level of employment generated and financial
viability/solvency  to strategic importance of the enterprise, among other things.
With this in mind, I have selected the following variables as instruments for Private Share
Ownership at privatization: level of employment, share of energy and fuel in total
operating cost, share of long-term liabilities in total liabilities, and (dummy variable for)
subsidies. Most importantly, note that apart from being plausible determinants of
ownership structure at privatization, the above choice of instruments also satisfies
22condition plim(Z'E)/T = 0. This is guaranteed by the fact that these instruments are not
determinants of current (post-privatization) enterprise performance, and hence cannot be
a part of E if left unaccounted for in equation (2).
It is relatively straightforward to argue for the viability of using above variables as
instruments. [Before describing the instruments in details, note that 1995 values of all
instruments were used to predict private share ownership at privatization in 1996 and (in
some cases) 1997]. Including level of Employment as an instrument intends to capture
the scale effect and, through this, the interest of the state in preserving ownership of that
particular enterprise. Politicians might be reluctant to privatize an enterprise with a large
labor force fearing that they will lose support base after enterprise is privatized and some
workers are laid off. Share of Energy and Fuel in Total Operating Cost intends to
measure the energy efficiency of the enterprise.  Holding enterprise size and type of
production constant this indicator is likely to contain information about technological
advancement of the enterprise and hence current and future competitiveness of its
products on the market. Including Share of Long-term liabilities in total liabilities should
account for financial structure of enterprises and be indicative of enterprise's ability to
raise long-term funds. A skeptical reader might argue that in an environment of directed
(and perhaps subsidized) state credit to state owned enterprises, this ratio would be
meaningless if measured before privatization. However to the extent that a part of the
credit to enterprises was extended by privately owned banks and state owned banks
competing with the former on the market for credits, the enterprise's share of long term
loans will contain information about solvency, output, competitiveness, as seen by those
creditors. Including an indicator of state backing of enterprises measured by a dummy
variable for Subsidies is intended to quantify the interest of the state in further preserving
ownership of the enterprise.
Even if the above measures (individually or jointly) might influence the state's
decision to privatize an enterprise) only marginally, they should carry significant weight
in potential private owner's objective function and hence determine the share of private
ownership once the enterprise is offered for privatization. Finally, including industry
dummies as instruments was thought to capture state's preferences in preserving
23ownership in some sectors which are perceived strategic. The following section justifies
the choice of variables describing the business environment.
Measuring Indicators of Business Environment
To quantify market competition faced by enterprises, we will attempt to use Herfindahl
index (H-index) based on sales in 2-digit industries of which the dataset has 37.
Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1986) show that performance of H-index is superior to
that of concentration ratios (share of N largest firms in the market) when sectors/markets
with high concentration are common. In addition, the H-index would be a more accurate
measure of concentration in cases when a number of large enterprises are left out of the
sample. With this in mind, I calculated H-index for 37 sectors based on sales/revenues
reported by 7,200 enterprises contained in 1997 sample. Although covering a broad base
of enterprises (over 60 percent of enterprises reporting to Lithuanian Department of
Statistics) and sectors in Lithuania, this measure is not without problems. First of all, it
fails to account for the share of imported goods in the market and thus the competition
faced by domestic producers from foreign firns  exporting to Lithuanian markets. Not
accounting for this effect is bound to overstate the market share of each enterprise and
understate its effect on efficiency and performance. This bias will be greater the larger
the share of imported goods in total market for that particular good.
Second, market share and hence market concentration can be endogenous to
performance. It can be argued, that being determined by central planners decisions,
market structure at initial stages of Transition can be treated as exogenous.  Yet it would
be less accurate to do so at a later stage when market-based incentives and mechanisms
worked their way to improved performnance  and subsequently to market share of
enterprises. However in our case, the extent of potential endogeneity of H-index will be
significantly reduced in the final sub-sample of 618 enterprises used in the analysis (see
below for the selection criteria) because of the large number of enterprises removed from
the initial sample of 7,200.
There are at least two reasons for using lagged (as opposed to contemporaneous)
values of subsidies as a dependent variable in the regressions to account for state support.
First of all, using lagged value of subsidies is likely to eliminate any potential
24endogeneity of state support with respect to current performance. Second, if history is of
any guidance for enterprise management, using lagged values of subsidies would be a
way to capture the effect of expected state support and hence necessity to restructure 27.
This will be a good measure of expected subsidies (and to a great extent also the overall
softness of budget constraint) particularly for enterprises that continue being fully state
owned throughout 1995-1997. However there is still a problem with subsidies being
jointly determined with ownership. In other words, some enterprises might face hard
budget constraints after they are privatized, which creates a problem in measuring the
relative importance of the effects of private ownership and business environment on
28 perfonnance
Unfortunately using subsidies (lagged or contemporaneous) would provide only
limited information about the extent of state support to enterprises and the softness of
budget constraints. A more complete analysis would have to include (1) arrears that
enterprises are allowed to run on various accounts (tax, social security, wages, etc), (2)
cost reductions associated with subsidized credits and other inputs, (3) special contracts,
among other direct and indirect ways to favor enterprises. Unfortunately the available
data prevents us from keeping a complete account of state assistance to enterprises and so
lagged values of subsidies will be used to proxy the full extent of state support and
softness of budget constraint.
Selection of Sample Size
The choice of the sample size for regression analysis is a crucial one here. Bearing in
mind the importance of explaining the ownership structure at privatization (i.e. the first
stage regression), only enterprises for which private share ownership at privatization can
be "explained" by available pre-privatization values of instruments were selected. Since
the data is available for 1995-1997 only, 1995 was set aside to provide data for
27 Kornai (1998) and subsequently Anderson, Korsun and Murrell (1999) emphasize the
expectational component of softness of budget constraint. They argue that decision to
restructure is largely a function of expected (rather than current) state support in times
when the enterprise is in trouble.
28 Controlling for endogeneity of variables describing business environment lies beyond
the scope of current paper and will be attempted by subsequent research.
25instruments. Subsequently, only the enterprises which were (state owned in 1995 and)
privatized in 1996 and (in a few cases also) 1997 were chosen. Private share ownership at
privatization (1996) was first regressed on the set of instruments discussed above. The
estimated values of 1996 share of private ownership were then used as an explanatory
variable in the regression of 1997 performance on potential determinants of it.
Enterprises reporting 100 percent state ownership throughout 1995-1997 were also
included in the sample as benchmark against which the performance of privatized
enterprises were to be judged.  Thus the only sample selection criteria applied in our case
boils down to choosing enterprises which reported 100 percent state ownership in 1995.
These enterprises were subsequently either privatized in 1996-1997 or remained state
owned throughout 1996-1997. Note that doing so restricts the sample to a number of
enterprises that took part in commercial (Stage II, 1996-1997) privatization only (of
course, along with fully state owned enterprises). Since the decision to include an
enterprise into the Stage I or Stage II privatization largely depended on the size of the
enterprise, its "strategic importance" and industry type and hence is exogenous to the
privatization outcome, our focusing on Stage II privatization does not introduce any bias
in estimation procedure which (an otherwise endogenous) sample selection criteria are
known to generate. It will instead allow us to judge the outcome and success of
Commercial Privatization alone as far as the effect of private ownership on performance
is concerned.
Using lagged (1996) estimated value of share of private ownership in the
second-stage equation (trying to explain 1997 performance) appears to have at least two
advantages. First, it allows for the effect of private ownership to work its way through
the performance. It might be argued that using contemporaneous measures of (estimated)
private share ownership to explain performance would understate the effect of former
because of the time required for the new ownership to undertake measures necessary to
boost production and efficiency. Second, it reduces the effect of bias introduced by the
possible endogeneity of ownership. Although 1997 performance is likely to be correlated
with lagged (1995 or 1996) performance (the latter being a potential determinant of
ownership structure), in a world of incomplete information and underdeveloped capital
markets in Transition, it is implausible to assume that 1996 ownership structure would
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directly depend on 1997 perfornance  . Yet as tempting as it might be to think that using
lagged (as opposed to contemporaneous) values of ownership variable would eliminate
the underlying endogeneity, it would merely reduce the extent of the bias primarily
because of the above mentioned correlation.
Table 5 contains the distribution of enterprises by ownership type and years of
privatization. Out of 618 enterprises to be used in the analysis 238 were privatized in
1996 with private share ownership averaging at 80 percent of capital. The state further
reduced its shareholding in those 238 enterprises in 1997 bringing it down to 18 percent
of capital on average from 20 percent. Out of 374 enterprise which continued to be fully
state owned as of 1996, 54 were privatized in 1997 with state still holding 24 percent
ownership on average in those enterprises. For these 54 enterprises private ownership
share as of 1997  was used as a dependent variable in the first-stage regression.
Subsequently a dummy variable DUMMY97 (which takes value of 1 if the enterprise is
privatized in 1997) was introduced in the second-stage regression to account for any
unobserved differences between enterprise privatized in 1996 and 199730.
Regression Results
The results of estimation of Equations 3 and 4 are contained in Table 6 and 7
respectively. It is perhaps logical to start this section with a formal justification of using
linear instrumental variables approach to estimate Equation 3. The OV version of
Hausman (1978) test rejected the null hypothesis that the OLS and 2SLS estimates of
29 Expectations and ability to forecast play important role here. For instance if the state
foresees that an enterprise could boost its output in 1997 either as a result of a relatively
straightforward measure (e.g. management change) or its strengthening monopoly
position on the market, it is likelier that the state will hold on to the enterprise and not
privatize it. On the contrary, if potential private owners evaluate profit potential of an
enterprise in 1997 as low, this is likely to keep them away from buying shares in this
enterprise ceteris paribus, even if it is up for privatization.
30 Note that for these 54 enterprises 1997 value of private share ownership (i.e. private
ownership at privatization) was used during both stages of the analysis. The results of
estimation (where enterprises privatized in 1997 were treated as fully state owned as of
1996) are not significantly different from those reported (where enterprises privatized in
1997 were treated as privatized and a dummy variable DUMMY97 was included) and
can be obtained from author upon request.
27regression coefficients are identical (under Ho:  f3OLS =  P2SLS)31,  which by itself implies a
failure to accept the hypothesis of no contemporaneous correlation between error term
and the regressors. Having said this, OLS estimates of coefficients in Equation 3 would
be inconsistent which establishes the need to estimate them by (among other alternatives)
a linear instrumental variables approach (2SLS). Summary statistics from the first stage
regression equation are reported on the bottom of Table 6.  Both the fit of regression and
F-test of zero values for instrumental variables used in the regression suggest a strong fit
for share of private ownership at privatization. The estimated values of private share
ownership were then used throughout the analysis in estimating Equations 3 and 4. In
both cases I reported the results of OLS in parallel with 2SLS to be able to draw some
conclusions based on the contrast of estimated coefficients. The results are definitely
worth paying some attention to.
The effect of estimated share of private ownership on performance of enterprises in
the sample appears to be positive and highly significant in all four regressions reported in
Table 6.  However the difference between the coefficients on private share ownership
under OLS and 2SLS is striking. Almost nine fold change in the magnitude of the effect
of private share ownership on sales suggests presence of  a pre-selection bias in
privatization process which was based perhaps on performance and financial
characteristics of enterprises. The direction of the change is indicative of a negative bias,
that is the state preserving ownership in better performing enterprises and privatizing the
under-performing ones.  This might be contrary to expectations of most of the readers
who would expect state to find it difficult to privatize under-performing enterprises and
hence put the better performing ones up for privatization first.  However this should not
look counterintuitive if by 1996 the (to-be privatized) enterprises were to largely
restructure (and put their books in order) and as a result become attractive for private
owners. Should this be the case, of course, the state's decision to privatize relatively
under-performing enterprises (which are nevertheless attracting private owners) for sale
first is by no means counterintuitive.
31 The F-statistic for joint insignificance of instruments included in the equation (3)
28Yet, a pessimistic reader could argue that one thing leading to this econometric
result could be a high concentration of enterprises with zero private ownership in the
sample. In order to test this hypothesis and check for the robustness of the results, I
eliminated fully state owned enterprises from the sample and run the regression with a
sub-sample of privatized enterprises only.  Results came to support the presence of a
negative selection bias at privatization: the coefficient on Private Share Ownership in
Equation 3 increased almost two fold from 0.48 to 0.95 after 2SLS was applied 32. The
difference in change of coefficients (i.e. nine fold when the full sample was used, and two
fold when only privatized enterprises are used) suggests that presence of enterprise in the
sub-sample (of privatized enterprises) is only a reflection of the state's decision to hold
residual ownership, as opposed to the (most important) decision to privatize vs. to keep,
and therefore could only be viewed as lower bound of the privatization bias (if the extent
of the bias is to be measured by the difference of coefficients between OLS and 2SLS).
On the other hand, the effect of subsidies appears negative and highly significant at
least in the case when sales were taken as performance indicator. An obvious
interpretation of the results would be that enterprises that received subsidies in 1996, and
thus as hypothesized above, were not forced to restructure hard enough, performed worse
in 1997. The effect of subsidies on exports is also negative and significant at 20 percent
confidence level when OLS is used but loses its significance after 2SLS is applied
(column 4). In both cases subsidies either become less significant or lose significance
after controlling for selection bias, suggesting that there is in fact some link between
ownership and subsidies hypothesized above.
The coefficients on market concentration do not produce any evidence of the effect
of market structure on domestic sales: the coefficients are imprecisely estimated and
change the signs in 2SLS regressions (Table 5 and 6).  A possible conclusion here is that
competition does not affect short-run measures of productivity of enterprises because
there is not enough time for competition to induce efficiency enhancing pressures on
equals 24.54, with critical value of F[4,  6021  being equal to 2.37. A similar test for
specification (4) resulted in value of F-statistic to be 3.46 which still leads to rejection of
null hypothesis of no correlation between error term and the regressors.
32 Results of these regressions are not reported but could be obtained from the author
upon request.
29enterprises. Another channel through which competition is unlikely to induce efficiency
and growth was presented in Aghion et al. (1997). The authors demonstrate that when
agency costs within innovating firms become sufficiently important the positive effect of
competition is reversed, and so we are back to Schumpeterian view that market
competition is detrimental to growth.
However, surprisingly enough, the pattern of coefficients on market competition is
drastically different when exports are used as a dependent variable. The coefficients are
positive and highly significant suggesting perhaps that market concentration or lack of
competition and near-monopoly power makes it more likely for enterprises to export.
[These results should look particularly trustworthy since there is no correlation between
level of exports and H-index (at least not inherent in the way the H-index was calculated),
as it might be the case between sales and H-index].  However surprising, I believe this
result has an explanation which is based on the ability of monopolists to extract
monopoly rents. In the presence of transaction costs associated with exporting goods
abroad (marketing abroad, export license, etc.), it could be argued that rents will make it
more likely for enterprise to be able to overcome the fixed export barriers -much like in
the classical Schumpeterian argument about the link between monopoly rents, R&D and
growth.
It should be noted that the estimation provide economically meaningful values for
coefficients on logarithms of capital and labor in all four regressions reported in Table 6,
suggesting (an almost) constant returns to scale production function in capital and labor 33.
However, share of capital in exports seems to be larger than share of capital in general
revenues, suggesting that exported goods are more capital intensive than sales in general.
Generally for all regressions, the estimation provides rather remarkable fit with included
variables capable of explaining from 51 to almost 70 percent of variation in dependent
variable.
33 I also tried to measure the curvature of production function by entering squared values
of LnK and InL into regression equations. In almost all cases the signs of the coefficients
came out negative suggesting declining marginal product of both labor and capital, with
the exception of export regression where marginal product of capital was estimated to be
positive. Results can be obtained from author upon request.
30Finally, there appears to be no significant difference in performance between
enterprises privatized in 1996 and those privatized in 1997: although the coefficient on
DUMMY97 is positive, it is highly insignificant in all regressions.
Our results from estimating Equation 4 appear to lend support for the level (as
opposed to change) specification discussed above (Table 7). Although positive, the
coefficients on lagged dependent variable are statistically different from unity and hence
reject the change specification in favor of the level one.  Coefficients of greatest interest
appear to provide consistent parents across both specifications used.  As in Equation 3,
private share ownership contributes positively and significantly to enterprise
performance. Similar to previous case, the coefficient on Private Share Ownership has
increased ten fold after the selection has been controlled.
VI. Conclusion
Lithuania offers an interesting case of a country 'in between' Central and Eastern Europe
-where privatization and restructuring were largely successful in bringing about better
enterprise performance and effective corporate governance - and the Commonwealth of
Independent States - where allegedly very little of it has taken place.  The paper provided
a review of Lithuanian Privatization process. It presented some evidence of improved
corporate performance in Lithuania over 1995-1997. But the main question posed in the
paper was whether these improvements were in any way caused by privatization and
transfer of state ownership and changes in business environment in which enterprises
operate.
The focus of analytical section of the paper was Lithuanian Commercial
Privatization program of 1996-1997. The intention was to check whether private
ownership matters at all in an environment where market institutions are at a relatively
advanced stages of development and business environment is friendlier than during early
stages of Transition process.  This study contrasts with others in a sense that it offers a
rigorous treatment of econometric problems which become particularly severe when
Commercial (for-cash) privatization programs are being studied. It is in fact the first
study to analyze consequences of a Commercial (as opposed to a Mass) Privatization
31program in Central and East European countries by using relatively recent data from
Lithuania.
(Without differentiating between types of private owners), I conclude that
(Commercial) transfer of state property to private owners in Lithuania has brought about
significant change in enterprise performance measured by increased revenues and
improved export performance. The results suggest a negative bias in selection of
enterprises for privatization. When controlled for this observed phenomena, the effect of
private share ownership becomes larger and increases its significance. Studies based on
data from early privatization programs from countries in Transition (predominantly Mass
Privatization programs) usually report moderate changes in the magnitude of coefficient
on private share ownership after selection bias is being controlled for.  The fact that
magnitude of coefficients on private ownership increased significantly (nine fold) after
controlling for enterprise selection prior to privatization, emphasizes the vitality of
controlling for selection bias when a Commercial case-by-case privatization is being
studied. On the other hand, expected subsidies seem to contribute negatively and in some
case significantly to performance indicators. However the paper finds no clear evidence
of the effect of market competition (measured by Herfindahl index) on performance
indicators in the short-run. The paper has a number of shortcomings. An apparent
drawback of the above analysis is that it does not account for the fundamental differences
between various types of private owners, e.g. insiders vs. outsiders, foreign vs. domestic,
and institutional vs. non-institutional private owners. Second, it does not account for
potential endogeneity in variables describing business environment which might
somewhat bias the estimated results.  These and related issues will be addressed in the
follow-up paper. Even so, policy implication of these results, I believe, are still useful not
only for Lithuania, but also for other FSU countries that lag behind in their effort to
privatize state owned enterprises and achieve output and productivity gains.
32Table 1.
Use of investment vouchers in Lithuania as of September 1995
Use of investment vouchers  Million Litas  Percent
Total  9802  93
Public subscription of shares  5,833  55.3
Tenders  415  4
Auctions  165  1.6
Privatization of residual state ownership in JSCs  392  3.7
Housing  2,042  19.4
Agricultural  enterprises  410  4
Land  545  5
Source: Lithuanian Department of Statistics, September 1995.
Table 2.
Basic Employment Statistics
Number of Enterprises with:
Number of  Number of  Employees per  Less than 10  Between 10 and  Between 50 and  Over 200
Enterprises*  Employees  Enterprise**  employees  50 employees  200 employees  employees
1995  5,807  583,753  101  686  3,091  1,476  555
(11.8%)  (53.2%)  (25.4%)  (9.6%)
1996  5,347  543,691  102  305  3,101  1,435  506
(5.7%)  (58.0%)  (26.8%)  (9.5%)
1997  7,185  560,394  78  449  4,645  1,626  465
(6.2%)  (64.6%)  (22.6%)  (6.5%)
* - Enterprises with missing values for Total Assets,  Revenues, or Employment were excluded from the
sample.  **  - Unweighted  average.
33Table 3.
Some Performance Indicators for Balanced Panel by Sectors, 1996-1997
Sectors  Revenue  Value Added  Employment  Revenue  Value
Million Litas  Million Litas  per Worker  Added per
worker
1996  12,414  3,306  214,683  57,826  15,400
Manufacturing  1997  15,050  3,719.5  200,962  74,892  18,509
Real % change  17.0  8.3  -6.4  25.3  16.0
1996  4,461  765  43,213  103,233  17,696
Utilities  1997  3,994  897  32,396  123,276  27,690
Real % change  -16.5  11.3  -25.0  13.4  50.5
1996  2,390  888  63,804  37,465  13,911
Construction  1997  3,072  1,165  61,895  49,627  18,824
Real % change  18.7  21.5  -3.0  22.7  25.5
1996  14,855  2,718  170,571  87,088  15,933
Services  1997  17,844  3,420  165,811  107,619  20,628
Real% change  11.6  17.4  -2.8  15.1  21.0
1996  970  403  29,491  32,900  13,653
Others  1997  1,169  4782  27,941  41,842  17,103
Real % change  12.0  10.2  -5.3  18.7  16.8
Note: There are 1,345 enterprises in Manufacturing, 124 in Utilities, 707 in Construction, 2,465 in
Services, and 498 in Others. PPI based inflation of 4.2, 6.0, 9.8, 8.5 and 8.5 percent were used to
establish the rate of real growth in Manufacturing, Utilities, Construction, Services and Others
respectively.
34Table  4.
Relationship  between  Revenue  performance  and State  Share,  1995-1997
State Share
100% State  More than 50%  Less than 20%
Owned  State Owned*  State Owned
1997  Revenue per Employee  31,700  43,864  95,931
Number of Enterprises  596  265  5,939
1996  Revenue per Employee  32,528  47,455  91,353
Number of Enterprises  648  257  4,112
1995  Revenue per Employee  32,163  38,088  81,420
Number of Enterprises  958  239  4,259
*-  This group does not include 100% state owned companies. Figures are in 1995 Litas.
Table  5.
Distribution  of Enterprises  by Types  of Ownership  and Years  of Privatization
1995  1996  1997
Fully State Owned  618  380  326
Privatized  in 1996  - 238  238
Mean  of Private  Share Ownership  - 0.80  0.82
Std of Private  Share Ownership  - 0.31  0.30
Privatized  in  1997  - - 54
Mean of Private Share  Ownership  - - 0.76
Std  of Private  Share  Ownership  - - 0.33
TOTAL  618  618  618
35Table  6.
OLS and 2SLS Estimation  of Equation  3
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable:
Log of Sales in 1997  Log of Exports in 1997
OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS
Constant  6.10***  6.19***  -10.1***  -9.62***
(15.77)  (10.88)  (-11.0)  (-9.14)
Private Ownership  0.28***  2.51***  1.09***  3.87***
(3.24)  (4.49)  (5.28)  (3.73)
LnK  0.40***  0.37***  0.58***  0.50***
(12.26)  (7.41)  (7.38)  (5.50)
LnL  0.50***  0.57***  0.22**  0.33***
(10.56)  (7.97)  (1.999)  (2.49)
Subsidies in 1996  -0.000013***  -0.00001**  -0.000012  -0.00001
(-3.97)  (-1.96)  (-1.56)  (-0.80)
Market Concentration  -0.143  0.49  3.36***  3.93***
(-0.35)  (0.79)  (3.45)  (3.40)
Dummy97  0.035  0.06  0.08  0.36
(0.29)  (0.33)  (0.27)  (1.09)
Industry dummies included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R-sq.  0.691  0.515  0.574  0.510
Number of Observations  618  618  612  612
First Stage Regression
Adjusted R-sq.  0.30  0.30
F-statistic for zero IVs  30.6***  30.6***
OV version of Hausman Test  24.54***  5.56***
Critical Value for F-statistic  2.37  2.37
T-statistics in parenthesis.  *  ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent
confidence levels respectively.
36Table 7.
OLS and 2SLS Estimation of Equation 4
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of
Sales per Labor in 1997
OLS  IV
Constant  2.28***  2.50***
(9.06)  (8.15)
Private Ownership  0.091  0.96***
(1.56)  (3.22)
Ln(Sales/Labor,9 95)  0.59***  0.57***
(32.9)  (25.1)
Total Assets  0.000  0.000
(0.81)  (0.39)
Subsidies in 1996  -0.00001**  -0.00000
(-2.12)  (-1.38)
DIummy97  0.025  0.03
(0.31)  (0.33)
Market Concentration  -0.24  0.03
(-0.89)  (0.09)
Industry dummies included  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R-sq.  0.66  0.59
Number of Observations  618  618
T-statistics  in parenthesis.  *  **  and * indicate  significance  at 1, 5 and
10 percent confidence levels respectively.
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